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[29] 
Tribally Defined Citizenship Criteria: 
Countering Whiteness as Property 





Abstract: This article implements the framework of whiteness of property 
to articulate the ways in which holdings of the Supreme Court of the United 
States (SCOTUS) have limited Tribal Nations’ sovereignty because of the 
illegibility and correlative dispossession of inherent sovereignty itself.  This 
article also highlights how these past SCOTUS opinions, especially recently, 
threaten to further reduce tribal sovereignty insofar as Tribal Nation 
citizenship remains based upon blood quantum.  The case studies examined 
herein were selected because of the ways they strategically diminished Tribal 
Nation sovereignty via rhetorical precarity created using equivocations on 
the meaning of “Indian.”  Through articulating how SCOTUS opinions 
shifted the meaning of sovereignty from a basis in Tribal Nations’ territory, 
i.e., property, towards one based on membership, blood quantum as another 
mechanism for dispossession and disappearance becomes clearer.  This 
article argues that SCOTUS’s blind spots with regard to tribal sovereignty 
are mechanisms of whiteness as property that make invisible the rights of 
Tribal Nations so as to dispossess sovereignty as another de-evolutionary 
tactic of de juro federal common law resulting in de facto property 
dispossession in the modern era.  Through SCOTUS opinions reshaping the 
meaning of who counts as “Indian,” sovereignty is further threatened 
because of increased precarity linked to blood quantum as a supposed racist 
qualifier for citizenship.  Most simply, if SCOTUS can enumerate that blood 
quantum serving as a basis for tribal sovereignty is racist, Tribal Nation 
sovereignty itself might be delegitimated, and the otherwise persistent debt 
owed to its citizens as first-in-time, first-in-right owners is erased; the debt 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Externally imposed, fixed and homogenizing conceptions of “Indian” 
by the dominant legal culture demonstrate what Jennifer Hendry and Melissa 
Tatum describe as “the jarring quality of universal claims within rights 
discourse. . .’to exercise sovereign agency as mastery over meaning.’”1  
Through construction of tribal citizenship qua “Indian,” the U.S. government 
maintains socially constructed power over Tribal Nations’ identities because 
the status “Indian” then eliminates the very differences making each nation 
unique and culturally sovereign.  Tribal citizenship is reduced to being 
“Indian” under federal law and policy.  Alternatively, if complete deference 
were given to Tribal Nations’ sovereignty to define citizenship based on their 
own cultures, beliefs, and perspectives, then the status of “Indian” could be 
decolonized from the logics of “whiteness as property.”2 
The social construction of “Indian” within the rhetoric of federal 
common law, as well as the use of a fictionalized blood quantum in Tribal 
Nations’ constitutions, have imposed precarity as part of the ideological and 
sovereign colonization by the U.S. Stereotypical perceptions of “being 
Indian,” and recent challenges of tribal sovereignty by the Indian Child 
 
∞ James E. Rogers College of Law, J.D. Class of 2019; University of Arizona, Rhetoric, 
Composition, and the Teaching of English, A.B.D., Ph.D. expected December 2020.  Special 
thanks to Professors Melissa Tatum and Rebecca Tsosie for their mentorship, scholarly 
brilliance, and support of a critical race analysis of federal Indian law.  Professor Tatum’s 
extensive constructive comments on earlier drafts and encouragement to submit made 
publication possible.  A very special thanks to Mary Kathryn Nagle, Abi Fain, Kēhaulani 
Kauanui, and other Native women scholars whose transformative insights built the foundation 
for this piece and my larger dissertation project.  I would also like to thank Cheryl Harris for 
her disruptive theoretical framework of whiteness as property, without which the analysis in 
this article could not unfold.  Thank you to my dear friend, Tom Knauer, for reading an earlier 
version and offering helpful edits.  I dedicate this article to my great grandmother, Nora 
“Grancy” Sams, and mother, Donna Simmons, both survivors of patriarchal violence who 
taught our family radical love and kept alight the belief that as humans, we belong to one 
another, knowing no one is free until all peoples have equal access to resources.  I also dedicate 
this article to all the citizens of the Tohono O’odham Nation and Pascua Yaqui Tribe who 
have inhabited the lands on which the University of Arizona and Tucson were built since time 
immemorial; without their stewardship and persistence, this article and my graduate education 
would not have been possible. 
1. Jennifer Hendry & Melissa L. Tatum, Human Rights, Indigenous Peoples, and the 
Pursuit of Justice, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 351, 374–75 (2016). 
2. “Whiteness as Property” was coined by Cheryl Harris’s article of the same name.  Most 
simply, this phrase refers to the additional benefits that inure to persons perceived as “white” 
by the legal system.  In contrast, African and Americans and Indigenous Peoples of the U.S. 
have been excluded from the privileges of property rights in ways that systemically 
subordinated their socioeconomic mobility.  See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 
HARVARD L. REV. 1707 (1993). 
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Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) cases reproduce this rhetorical precarity.3  This 
article highlights the importance of Tribal Nations to act to “decolonize” their 
governments’ use of “blood quantum” criteria and align their self-determined 
citizenship4 criteria with their own spiritual, cultural, and linguistic traditions, 
in order to reaffirm their inherent sovereignty in relation to the U.S.5  This 
article suggests a broader implication: that removing blood quantum from 
citizenship criteria can further protect Tribal Nations’ inherent sovereignty 
from equal protection attacks. 
Although scholars have offered many explanations as to why Indian law 
cases most often lose in federal courts, few of them analyze the categorical 
foundations of federal Indian law itself.  Through critically analyzing the 
ways in which the categorical designation of “Indian” has been used 
strategically to achieve the Supreme Court’s political ends, it may better 
explain why the rights of Native peoples in the U.S. are rarely provided 
adequate remedies in federal courts.  However, federally recognized tribes 
that define their citizenship based on culturally relevant ways of being and 
genealogical terms for family relationships have mitigated future equal 
protection claims against their political status. 
 
II.  FIXED CATEGORIZATION OF RADICALLY 
DIFFERENT TRIBAL NATION COMMUNITIES AS 
“INDIAN” MISREPRESENTS TRIBES’ POLITICAL STATUS 
AS AUTHORITY BASED UPON “BEING INDIAN,” 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, OR BLOOD QUANTUM 
 
Deployment of “Indian” as a legal classification by the U.S. government 
homogenizes cultural differences, and doing so causes confusion about Tribal 
citizens’ identities.  Application of “Indian” to Native peoples in the U.S. 
covertly equivocates on the meaning of Native cultural identity,6 functioning 
 
3. See infra notes 71 and 72. 
4. The term “citizenship” more accurately reflects the political status of Tribal Nations 
as sovereign governments but “membership” is more widely used, especially after the 
Oliphant case.  This article prioritizes using “citizenship” because of its implicit recognition 
of Tribal Nations’ inherent sovereignty; however, because of federal Indian law’s primary use 
of “membership,” I also use it at times throughout this article to aid in understanding.  
However, both words refer to the persons comprising Tribal Nations that have possessed 
inherent sovereignty since time immemorial, whose citizens are determined in accordance 
with each nation’s constitution whether oral or written.  
5. This article is a preliminary analysis of the ways SCOTUS has reaffirmed a racialized 
interpretation of Indian identity despite long-standing precedence affirming that Indian is a 
political status.  While there are many Tribal Nations in the U.S. who do not include blood 
quantum criteria in their constitutions, the scope of this project is limited to emphasizing the 
importance of eliminating blood quantum as a “buffer” against future SCOTUS rulings. 
6. See Mary Beth Mader, Foucault and Social Measure, 17 J. FRENCH PHIL. 3, 18 (2007), 
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as if all Tribal Nation group identities are the same.  Public administration 
carries out population management7 through utilization of categories without 
regard to whether the general scope of the category assigned to any particular 
individual or group is erroneous.  These categories are sometimes normative, 
that is, setting the parameters of what essentializing elements “count” as that 
category itself; other times, these categories are descriptive, that is, 
describing the essentializing elements of the relevant category.  This tactic of 
U.S. public policies intending to manage large populations is a common 
move that dispossesses self-defined cultural identities in ways that often go 
unnoticed.  As Mary Beth Mader explains, 
 
One common objection to the use of the statistical notion of the 
norm is that since its use often vacillates between descriptive and a 
normative sense it is fallaciously equivocal. . . . [S]ignificant 
instances of covert equivocation and tacit amalgams occur on the 
very level of the statistical concepts of mean and ratio . . . . 
. . . . 
[A]side from the oft-noted problem of actually crafting the 
definitions under which observed phenomena will be classed (the 
problem of determining what counts as measurable qualities), and 
the problem of the norm’s equivocal descriptive or prescriptive 
status, there is also the problem of the sort of overlooked 
equivocations on the ontological or conceptual ‘level’ . . . .8 
 
In order to establish social measures across large populations, what 
counts as measurable must first be determined and defined, either 
prescriptively (normalizing) or descriptively (retroactively).  While the U.S. 
government has not yet provided a clear definition of “Indian,” it has 
deployed the more unintelligible fiction of blood quantum as a measurable 
quality for determining Indian status and property rights, an ontological 
equivocation of “being Indian.”  This intentional category error of assigning 
a generic category of “Indian” to different Tribal Nation communities, 
usually distinctive in culture, language, and spiritual practices, allowed the 
 
for an in-depth discussion of social measures and “equivocations.”  This article intentionally 
utilizes the terms “Tribal Nations” to refer to the 574 federally recognized tribes.  “Native 
peoples” or “Tribal citizens” is used to refer to members of these politically and culturally 
sovereign nations; whereas the term “Indigenous” captures the first-in-time aboriginal rights 
of these peoples and nations under customary international law, it does not capture the customs 
of self-reference primarily used by Native scholars in the U.S. 
7. For an extensive analysis of Foucault’s idea of “population management power,” see 
DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE 
LIMITS OF LAW (Duke Univ. Press, rev. & expanded ed. 2015) (2009). 
8. See Mader, supra note 6, at 3, 18. 
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federal government throughout U.S. history to manage large populations of 
Native peoples and their property rights across the vast territory of the U.S. 
As a tool of dispossession, the blood quantum quality served to be something 
measurable based on a person’s parentage to determine who counted as 
“Indian.”  That is, while the definition of “Indian” remained ambiguous, the 
definition of blood quantum was treated as discrete and measurable.  
However, there were other collateral consequences to mainstream 
conceptions of Tribal citizens’ identities through the ambiguous use of Indian 
in the government’s project of land dispossession. 
The category “Indian” has widely been taken up in mainstream society, 
circulated, and reproduced to the point that the differences between Native 
peoples have been largely made invisible.  We see this active obliteration of 
difference when Donald Trump9 testified to Congress, “they don’t look like 
Indians to me, and they don’t look like Indians to Indians.”  Trump was 
opposing the building of a casino that was competing with his own casino 
interests in non-Indian gaming; the implication is that the group is 
insufficiently culturally distinct from non-Indians to be considered Indian at 
all: a rhetorical trick using the category of “Indian” as its pawn.  A few 
arbitrary and stereotypical associations with “Indian” become tethered to the 
term, which circulate broadly in mainstream society until “being Indian” 
requires fitting into a stereotypical conception, such as dressing in traditional 
ceremonial attire.  It begs the question, “what does ‘being Indian’ look like?”  
In federal Indian policy, it looked like having parents who had literally been 
“counted” on the tribal rolls during Indian relocation across the country, a 
signifier of persons supposedly possessing sufficient “blood quantum.” 
Assimilationist policies that determined who counted as Indian based on 
“blood quantum” derived from parentage were an overt part of federal Indian 
policies until the Self-Determination Era, which included publication by 
Congress of formal application procedures for federal recognition in 1978.10  
Until this time, reservations and boarding schools were expressly intended to 
assimilate Native peoples into the cultural norms of white settlers, a 
genocidal logics intending to eradicate cultural differences.  However, it 
cannot be stressed enough that dispossession of land required the 
disappearance of Native peoples because if no individual Tribal citizen 
whose ancestors were “first in time” occupants of the territory of the U.S. 
persist, then there can be no future property rights exercised. 
Given extensive and long-standing federal efforts to assimilate Native 
peoples, the group right of self-determination was only recently recognized 
 
9. While Mr. Trump was elected President of the U.S. in 2016, the fairness of the election 
is still widely contested. 
10. See DAVID E. WILKINS & HEIDI KIIWETINEPINESIIK STARK, AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLITICS AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 158–59 (4th ed. 2018). 
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when President Nixon “called upon Congress to repudiate the termination 
policy and declared that Tribal self-determination would be the goal of his 
administration.”11  Tribal self-determination culminated in the legal 
precedent established in 1974 by Morton v. Mancari that still stands as good 
law for the legal principle that “Indian” is a political status and not a racial 
designation, reaffirming political sovereignty and self-determination.12 
 
A.  “Indian” Is a Political Status13 
 
While Morton v. Mancari held that federally recognized tribes 
possessed a “unique political status” to which the U.S. owed an obligation, 
federal Indian policy is still interwoven with racist underpinnings of blood 
quantum that go back to allotment era policies.14  Mancari was distinctive 
because it affirmed tribes as groups with a special political status unlike other 
sovereigns.  Federal recognition of tribes’ political legitimacy is independent 
of members’ blood quantum percentage. 
Mancari held that the Bureau of Indian Affairs policy giving members 
of federally recognized tribes preference for hiring and promotion was not 
discrimination based on race but a public policy promoting the U.S. trust 
obligation.  “As long as the special treatment of Indians can be tied rationally 
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward Indians, such 
legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”15  While Mancari affirmed 
federally recognized tribes’ special political status as sovereigns, inherent 
sovereignty has existed since time immemorial and certainly prior to the 
formation of the U.S. Tribes’ inherent sovereignty to decide their own criteria 
for citizenship was more recently reaffirmed in Santa Clara Pueblo.16 
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court held that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 
 
11. WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 159. 
12. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 537 (1974) (holding the Bureau of Indian Affairs 
policy giving members of federally recognized tribes preference for hiring and promotion was 
not discrimination based on race but a public policy promoting the U.S. trust obligation).  More 
recently in McGirt v. Oklahoma, SCOTUS held that for purposes of the Major Crimes Act, 
land throughout much of eastern Oklahoma reserved for the Creek Nation since the 19th 
century remains a Native American territory. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2542 (2020).  
More importantly, the Court explained that when “asked whether the land these treaties 
promised remains an Indian reservation for purpose of federal criminal law,” they responded 
that “[b]ecause Congress has not said otherwise, we hold the government to its word.”  Id. at 
2459.  That is, without abrogation by Congress, the U.S. trust obligation providing the 
rationale for Mancari would likely be reaffirmed based on the McGirt rationale. 
13. Some ideas in this section were adapted from my unpublished dissertation proposal 
titled, “Indigenous Feminist Pedagogy Disorienting Whiteness as Disappearance in the 
Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013,” defended November 1, 2018. 
14. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537. 
15. Id. 
16. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). 
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25 United States Code § 1302, does not create a federal cause of action for 
declaratory and injunctive relief where tribal membership criteria is gender 
biased.17  There, the female tribal member sought injunctive and declaratory 
relief for the disparate treatment she received under her tribe’s gender-biased 
code.18  However, the Court was unwilling to diminish tribal sovereignty by 
ruling on the substantive merits of the case and held it lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction for non-habeus corpus relief.19  While this modern affirmation of 
inherent sovereignty deferred to the tribe to determine its membership, there 
is a long history of federal policy shaping tribe’s membership criteria for its 
citizens. 
The Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934 had encouraged tribes to 
adopt initial constitutions modeled on the U.S. constitution.  Most tribes 
defined citizenship in part by adopting some level of blood quantum as they 
were compelled to align their constitutional construction with the IRA 
definition of “Indian” as follows: 
 
The term “Indian” as used in this Act shall include all persons 
of Indian descent who are “…members of any recognized Indian 
tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are 
descendants of such members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing 
within the present boundaries of any Indian reservation, and shall 
further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian 
blood.”20 
 
That is, initial federal recognition of Tribal Nations under IRA included 
the use of blood quantum—a racist category—as part of recognition criteria.  
“Indian blood” is a legal fiction that essentializes Native peoples in the U.S. 
as somehow biologically distinct from non-Indians, but its true intent was to 
ensure that Indians disappeared over time.  Subsequently, tribes used the IRA 
definition when memorializing their citizenship criteria in their IRA 
constitutions.21  However, the original mandatory criteria published by 
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 1978 for the tribal process of gaining 
federal recognition did not include blood quantum criteria as follows: 
 
 
17. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 49. 
18. Id. 
19. Id.  
20. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73–383, 48 Stat. 988 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 5129 (2020)) (emphasis added). 
21. Refer to the archive of constitutions collected in the appendix of MELISSA L. TATUM, 
MIRIAM JORGENSEN, MARY E. GUSS & SARAH DEER, STRUCTURING SOVEREIGNTY: 
CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIVE NATIONS (2014), available at https://nnigovernance.arizona.edu/ 
crc/action/full (last visited Oct. 17, 2020). 
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[1] [I]dentification of the petitioners “from historical times 
until the present on a substantially continuous basis, as ‘American 
Indian’ or ‘Aboriginal’” by the federal, state or local governments, 
scholars, or other Indian tribes; [2] the habitation of the tribe on land 
identified as Indian; [3] a functioning government that had authority 
over its members; [4] a constitution; [5] a roll of members based on 
criteria acceptable to the secretary of the interior; [6] not being a 
terminated tribe; and [7] members not belonging to other tribes.22 
 
The political presumption was that in order for the member roll to be 
“based on criteria acceptable to the secretary of interior,”23 the tribe’s 
definition needed to include a blood quantum criterion.  This implication is a 
remnant of allotment era assimilation policies.24  But there is no explicit 
requirement of blood quantum for a tribe to become federally recognized, 
and this criterion is likely a suspect racial classification under equal 
protection case law.  Because tribes generally used outlines of constitutions 
provided by the federal government, most tribes today still require some level 
of blood quantum for citizenship.25 
It is particularly clear that after Mancari, SCOTUS affirmed the 
classification of Indian preference based on political status as 
constitutional.26  The residue of racial bias tied to blood quantum remains 
 
22. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 24 (emphasis added). 
23. It’s also worth noting that many tribes’ constitutions include a clause requiring 
Secretary of Interior approval to amend their constitution.  Amendments to these constitutions 
to exclude this requirement would be a requisite first step to amending the citizenship criteria.  
See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, where the Court affirmed that terms of IRA do not 
govern tribes such as the Navajo who declined to accept its provisions. 471 U.S. 195, 198–99 
(1985). 
24. While the recognition process was revised in 2015 to expedite the application and 
reduce costs, it remains substantially the same. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 27. 
25. Matthew Fletcher now suggests that it was a myth that tribes were handed complete 
constitutions and asked to adopt them, but instead were given outlines as guides.  
See Matthew Fletcher, The Myth of the Model IRA Constitution?, TURTLE TALK  
(Nov. 21, 2007), https://turtletalk.blog/2007/11/21/the-myth-of-the-model-ira-constitution/.  
Technically, federally recognized tribes are legal entities that may transact business directly 
with the federal government that were often comprised of disparate cultural groups in one 
location or geographically dislocated but genealogically connected for a myriad of political 
and military reasons.  See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.03 (Nell Jessup 
Newton ed., 2017). 
26. See Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as Racial 
Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958 (2011) (discussing how Mancari obfuscates the racialization 
and politicization of Indian tribes); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal Protection 
Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759 (1991) (discussing Mancari’s “political” 
approach for characterizing Indians for purposes of constitutional review under the Equal 
Protection clause). The differentiation between Indian as a sovereign group and as an 
individual is an important distinction as rights inure differentially, but is beyond the scope of 
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troublesome given that SCOTUS could strike down as unconstitutional any 
tribal laws discriminating on the basis of race using modern equal protection 
case law to challenge the very foundation of tribal citizenship if Mancari 
were to be overturned.  That is, if tribal status is determined to be a racial 
classification because of blood quantum criteria for citizenship, then under 
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),27 sovereignty of a tribe could be 
questioned as unlawful discrimination by SCOTUS. Further, because of the 
totalizing way in which “Indian” has been ascribed to all tribes, the 
perception of one tribe’s citizenship status criteria being characterized as 
unlawfully racist would likely have implications for all federally recognized 
tribes. This risk is most apparent under the recent federal challenges of the 
ICWA cases. 
Dismantling tribal governance and political status is certainly a 
worthwhile project for non-Indian gaming interests that are in direct 
economic competition with some tribes.  Persons and businesses 
economically motivated to de-recognize tribes that compete with their own 
gaming interests have every incentive to declare citizenship criteria unlawful.  
In what follows, I will look at three actual categorical “misinterpretations”28 
of “Indian” that either potentially or actually created precarity for tribes as 
diminishment of sovereignty: Donald Trump’s 1993 testimony to Congress,29 
the Oliphant v. Suquamish30 case, and the Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl case.  
These examples aim to impress upon the reader the urgency to eliminate 
blood quantum criteria to avoid the use of this strategy of dispossession 






27. See generally Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–284, 82 Stat. 73 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304) (2020)).  This legislation effectively provided all the 
rights enumerated in the bill of rights except for the establishment clause, the grand jury 
requirement, and quartering of troops.  While ICRA requires indigent defense counsel be 
provided, the legislative scope does not include non-Indians in Indian Country. 
28. I cautiously use the word “misinterpretations” here, as it is most likely that, 
rhetorically, the relevant interests in each of these cases is such that the deployment of “Indian” 
for achieving political or economic interests was done intentionally.  
29. Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Native Am. Affairs of the Comm. on Nat. 
Res., 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 103–17, Part V, at 175 (1993) (statement of Donald Trump, 
Chairman and President, Trump Organization).  See also Gillian Brockell, ‘They don’t look 




30. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (holding tribes do not have 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians perpetrating crimes in Indian country). 
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 B.  Trump’s Rhetorical Strategy to Assimilate Mashantucket 
Pequot Peoples for Economic Gain 
 
When Trump testified to Congress in an attempt to create an urgent 
concern that reservation casinos were fostering organized crime, he treated 
“being Indian” as if it were a performative act.  He said, “if you look at some 
of the reservations that you have approved—you, sir, in your great wisdom, 
have approved—I will tell you right now . . .  They don’t look like Indians to 
me, and they don’t look like Indians to Indians.”31  Trump was referring to 
members of the Mashantucket Pequots tribe, a federally recognized tribe, 
whom he was accusing of conspiring with the mafia.  This statement implies 
that one might be able to look at a person and determine their Indian status, 
which cannot possibly be based on the political status of Indians as members 
of sovereign nations.  It implies the racist conception that Indians are only 
Indian if they appear to be persons of color, or that Indians must dress or act 
in culturally distinctive ways that mark them as outside of mainstream 
society, likely in ways that trope “being Indian” according to mainstream 
normative stereotypes.  Trump implied that “Indian” status should be based 
on the performance of stereotypical “Indian-ness,” which his speech 
indicated did not align in a persuasive way with the conception of “Indian.”  
Arguably, however, Trump made this statement a rhetorical device, 
appealing to his audience’s own stereotypes about “being Indian,” to call into 
question the status of the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe for his own potential 
economic gain. 
The Mashantucket Pequot Tribe has a reservation in Ledyard, 
Connecticut where the Foxwoods Resort and Casino, the largest casino in the 
world, is operated.  In 1993, Trump had also begun investing in casinos in 
Atlantic City and Las Vegas which were in direct competition with the 
Tribe’s.  His testimony most likely intended to convince Congress to revoke 
federal recognition required for casino operations so as to eliminate casino 
interests that competed with his own. 
The error Trump made when he testified to Congress was his treatment 
of “being Indian” as something other than a political status and more akin to 
an activity-based identity.  James Gee differentiates between activity-based 
and relational identities in his book Teaching, Learning, Literacy in our 
High-Risk High-Tech World.32  Most simply put, activity-based identities are 
 
31. Statement of Donald Trump, supra note 29, at 242; Brockell, supra note 29, at 03:56–
04:07.  Ideas in this paragraph were adapted from the final unpublished paper for Professor 
Tsosie’s Federal Indian Law course at James E. Rogers College of Law, “Disorienting the 
Violence of Whiteness as Disappearance: Activist Deborah Parker’s Critical Race 
Testimony.” 
32. JAMES PAUL GEE, TEACHING, LEARNING, LITERACY IN OUR HIGH-RISK HIGH-TECH 
WORLD: A FRAMEWORK FOR BECOMING HUMAN 63 (2017). 
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discourse communities where someone can become fluent in its practices and 
then become recognized by others in terms of that identity, such as being a 
professor or a lawyer.  When ways of being, speaking, acting, dressing, and 
performing are sufficiently and fluently demonstrated, others accept the 
person’s normative performance as a member of the activity-based group.  
These identities are akin to “joining a club.”  In comparison, relational 
identities are ascribed by authorities in power to all members of a group and 
assign hierarchies within a system or institutional structure.  Normative, 
relational identities are those that institutions of power tend to treat as 
“fixed,” such as race and gender, for the purposes of widescale population 
management.  In the case of being “Indian,” group outsiders, here the U.S. 
government externally imposed this ascription to Native peoples.33 
Trump’s comment equivocates on relational (Indian as a political status) 
and activity-based (dressing and behaving like an Indian) identity categories 
for his own purposes, in hopes of persuading Congress that the Mashantucket 
Pequot Tribe should not be counted as “Indians” eligible for federal 
authorization under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988.34  Trump’s 
rhetorical appeal nicely illustrates the difference between activity-based 
identities and relational identities.35  Indian status as members of federally 
recognized tribes are relational identities based on political status; that is, the 
identity is imposed or assigned by other people and, primarily, by federal 
Indian law.  Federal laws and policy refer to Native peoples in the U.S. as 
“Indian,” and benefits conferred by the federal government depend on proof 
of inclusion in this relational category.36 
 
33. Over 1,033 cultural groups in the U.S. are referred to as “Indian” (573 federally 
recognized tribes including Native Alaskans) where there are not necessarily any common 
characteristics across groups besides aboriginal occupancy of the Americas.  Identities of 
Native peoples are more fundamental in their self-determined conceptions than either of these 
“outsider” conceptions. 
34. Indian and Gaming Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2020)). 
35. The point of contact between relational identities and activity-based identities is 
illuminated by Sara Ahmed in her article A Phenomenology of Whiteness.  Where a person of 
color might perform “whiteness” by engaging in activities characterizing mainstream white 
culture, that does not eliminate or alter a relational identity such as race.   
Sara Ahmed, A Phenomenology of Whiteness, 8 FEMINIST THEORY 149, 149–68 (2007).  Ersula 
Ore provides the example of Bill Clinton “troping Blackness” as well as President Obama 
altering his speech for white audiences and Black audiences, as a rhetorical performance of 
race. Ersula Ore, Whiteness as Racialized Space: Obama and the Rhetorical Constraints of 
Phenotypical Blackness, in RHETORICS OF WHITENESS: POSTRACIAL HAUNTINGS IN POPULAR 
CULTURE, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND EDUCATION 256, 257 (Tammie M. Kennedy, Joyce Irene 
Middleton & Krista Ratcliffe eds., 2017). 
36. While Alaskan Natives are also federally recognized tribes, their status is unique from 
American Indians in the other states.  Native Hawaiians are not federally recognized, and their 
benefits also vary.  While there are some similar benefits conferred to Alaskan Natives and 
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Here, the benefit of concern is the right of the Indian tribal government 
to run gaming operations on the reservation.  The categorical identity of 
Indian37 applies to all Native peoples who may have never referred to 
themselves as “Indians” outside of the legal parameters of federal Indian law 
or other references made by non-Indians and other outsiders to Tribal Nation 
communities.  The label “Indian” functions within a hierarchical legal 
structure that has functioned both to bestow certain privileges to “Indians” 
who are also members of federally recognized tribes and to dispossess 
persons of property rights; that is, Indians who count as “Indians” count 
within the structural power of the U.S. government precisely because their 
property rights were once extinguished to ancestral homelands, creating 
Congress’s “unique obligation” toward the Indian.  To “count” or qualify as 
an Indian is to reproduce and remind the listener of the debt the U.S. owes to 
Native peoples; the extent to which Indians may no longer “count,” is the 
extent to which that debt is forgotten or made invisible. 
Trump intends to persuade Congress that the Mashantucket Pequot 
peoples no longer “count” as Indians.  However, Trump’s treatment of Indian 
identity as an activity-based identity, something more akin to being a casino 
owner or a lawyer, is a fallacious equivocation or category error.  That is, one 
designated category is substituted for another within the rhetorical situation 
created by the speaker, while treating the equivocation as if it is valid.  The 
identity “Indian” is not one that a person may one day decide to become by 
participating in group activities and acquiring the specific language, actions, 
attire, and mannerisms of being “Indian” such as one might do to become an 
accepted member of a social club with particular group norms. 
By treating the concept “Indian,” which is a political status, as if it were 
an activity-based and fluid concept, Trump intended to raise doubt in the 
minds of his audience that Mashantucket Pequot people should not count as 
“Indian” and be eligible to operate gaming facilities.  The relational identity 
of Indian is not like joining a club or becoming a business partner with the 
federal government.  Trump’s rhetoric equivocates being “Indian” with being 
a member of a voluntary association or group, like a club that one might join 
and acquire the norms of dressing, acting, and speaking through practice in 
order to become a member.  While one might expect Mr. Trump to utilize 
this kind of equivocation for his own potential gain, it is more surprising and 
disturbing to realize the Supreme Court of the United States deployed a 
similar strategy in Oliphant. 
 
Native Hawaiians, they do not enjoy the identical protections of the political status of “Indian.”  
The scope of this article is limited to focusing on the term “Indian” in federal law. 
37. Here, there is no differentiation between “Indian” as used to connote individuals who 
are members of the Mashantucket Pequot tribe and the tribe as a political entity, which is a 
category error; Trump extrapolates here from the individual to the sovereign nation. 
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C. Rehnquist’s Rhetorical Strategy Equivocating Individual 
Identity with Group Political Status 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) opinion Oliphant 
v. Suquamish38 discursively constructs individual non-Indian and “Indian”39 
identity in a way that further dispossesses tribes of sovereignty.  Several 
justices, including Rehnquist, made fallacious equivocations on the term 
“Indian” similar to Trump’s in Oliphant, which became clear during oral 
arguments; this artful turn of words had a devastating impact on tribal 
sovereignty because of its focus on a liberal view of “Indian” focusing on 
individual persons instead of tribes.40  When Oliphant decided that tribes 
could no longer prosecute non-Indians, it represented the single most 
significant limitation on tribal sovereignty by SCOTUS since the Marshall 
trilogy41 by virtue of limiting tribes’ exercise of criminal jurisdiction42 in 
Indian country.  Arguably, this was an overreach of SCOTUS with regard to 
making new laws, which should be reserved for the legislative branch; also, 
plenary power over Indian affairs has generally been reserved for Congress.43  
In federal Indian policy, the judiciary traditionally has deferred to laws 
passed by Congress because of its understood plenary power over Indians; 
however, part of the Oliphant decision’s rationale was that Congress never 
intended tribes to have jurisdiction over non-Indians given that the allotment 
era policies44 aimed to assimilate Indians into white culture and eliminate 
 
38. Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
39. While “Indian” is identity assigned by colonizing Europeans due to an error when 
encountering Indigenous peoples in what has become known as the Americas, I use it 
throughout this article because of its technical meaning in federal Indian law. It is racist and 
connotes an inaccurate rationale inscribed by colonization. 
40. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 191.  Analysis of this oral argument was first produced for my 
final papers for Professor Tatum’s LAW 550A & LAW 699 courses during Fall 2018 at James 
E. Rogers College of Law and gave rise to this article.  For a complete critique of the flawed 
rationale of Oliphant, see Peter C. Maxfield, Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe: The Whole is 
Greater than the Sum of the Parts, 19 J. CONTEMP. L. 391, 436 (1993). 
41. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 
(1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
42. When considering criminal jurisdiction in Indian country, regulatory/legislative and 
adjudicatory/judicial jurisdiction collapse.  Regulatory jurisdiction is the authority of a 
government to make laws and require persons in that territory follow them (how states operate 
in the U.S.).  Adjudicatory jurisdiction is comprised of subject matter jurisdiction (states have 
general jurisdiction and can hear anything that is not a federal question) and personal 
jurisdiction (ability to require a party to appear in court). 
43. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing ceiling of judicial power of review of executive 
and legislative branches); see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 153 (1803) (solidifying 
the power of judicial review of the U.S. Supreme Court). 
44. See General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000). 
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Indian country entirely.  SCOTUS relied on this interpretation of the 
Allotment Act, in part, to justify changing tribes’ legal authorization to 
prosecute non-Indians. 
Oliphant is one of the most notorious federal Indian law cases ever 
decided, known not just for its bold enactment by “legislators in robes” 
diminishing tribes’ political sovereignty through limiting tribal jurisdiction 
to prosecute non-Indians but also for its lack of application of the canons of 
construction and principles of federal Indian law.  The Oliphant case 
consolidated two lower-court Ninth Circuit appeals cases.  The first non-
Indian defendant, Mark David Oliphant, was charged with assaulting a 
Suquamish tribal officer during the tribe’s Chief Seattle Days; the second 
non-Indian defendant, Daniel B. Belgarde was charged with “‘recklessly 
endangering another person’ and injuring tribal property” after running into 
a police car following a high-speed chase.45  Both defendants petitioned the 
Supreme Court with writs of habeas corpus after the District court and Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the tribe’s jurisdiction over the matters 
(Belgarde’s Ninth Circuit appeal was pending when certiorari was granted). 
The main issue addressed by the court as a question of first impression 
was whether tribal courts have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.46  
SCOTUS held that tribal courts do not have jurisdiction over non-Indians 
based on the rationale that the tribes’ power over non-Indians was abrogated 
when tribes became “domestic dependent nations” under the authority of the 
U.S.47  The decision further asserted that unless the authority to prosecute 
non-Indians was expressly delegated by Congress, it did not exist. However, 
this novel interpretation of long-standing legal precedence arising originally 
from the Marshall Trilogy redefined sovereignty of all tribes in the modern 
era. 
The SCOTUS primarily looked at two factors as rationale justifying its 
holding as follows: (1) the tribal requirements under the ICRA right to 
counsel varies from constitutional requirements; and (2) tribes have different 
laws not known by non-members. Reliance on both factors is problematic for 
a multitude of reasons.  First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is 
triggered for state sovereigns when a felony occurs, jail time may be imposed, 
or the accused qualifies as “indigent” and cannot pay for their own 
representation; however, ICRA limits tribal sentencing to less than one year 
and a fine of no more than $5,000.  In effect, these sentencing limitations 
 
45.  Oliphant, 98 U.S. at 194. 
46.  Id. at 195. 
47.  See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 17–18.  The SCOTUS does not specify 
by what act sovereignty was abrogated except that upon submission to the sovereignty of the 
U.S., tribes gave up full sovereignty.  “Such an exercise of jurisdiction over non-Indian 
citizens of the United States would belie the tribes’ forfeiture of full sovereignty in return for 
the protection of the United States.”  Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 211. 
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limit the ability to punish persons who have committed felony-level crimes 
that would customarily exceed these sentencing provisions.  Therefore, tribes 
generally look to the federal government to punish felony crimes committed 
by Indians, non-Indians, and non-members so that the sentencing is 
appropriately matched to the crime. 
In consideration of both the right to counsel and the lack of familiarity 
with tribal laws presumes a framework of the U.S. legal system where the 
model of restitution48 and the long-standing practice of tribal justice systems 
were not legible at all to SCOTUS where it did not resemble the U.S. “formal 
court system.”49  Sadly, what tribes lacked was not a fully developed legal 
system but a politically legible way to translate their practices to SCOTUS, 
politically persuasive translations of these legal systems that exercised their 
inherent sovereignty by ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of its own 
citizens and residents.  Tatum explains how this breakdown of rights 
discourses at the intersections of legal cultures is a “desire on the part of the 
dominant legal culture ‘to exercise sovereign agency as mastery over 
meaning.’”50  That desire of the SCOTUS is precisely what was at play in 
Oliphant, which is made abundantly clear during the oral arguments: the 
Supreme Court had decided tribal legal systems could not be fair to non-
Indians and fallaciously equivocated on the meaning of “Indian” to justify 
this conclusion. 
During oral arguments, Attorney Ernstoff explained to Justice Stewart 
that constitutional rights do not exist per se under the jurisdiction of the 
Suquamish Indian Tribe for non-Indians; it is at this point that Rehnquist 
interrupts his explanation to make clear that is his concern. Rehnquist says, 
“Well, if you[‘re a member] [. . .] of [a] moose l[odge] and a grand moose 
[locks you] [. . .] up in a men’s room overnight you are not being deprive[d] 
of any constitutional right, are you?”51  Raising this question implied Justice 
Rehnquist’s conflation of the Suquamish Tribe government with a voluntary 
association, which is not subject to the affirmative protection requirements 
of the bill of rights as a state actor would be under substantive due process 
protections under the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Oliphant, the import of 
Rehnquist’s assertion is that the non-Indian defendant would not enjoy equal 
protection rights if the tribe, qua voluntary association, had been allowed to 
 
48. Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 197. 
49. Id. 
50. Tatum, supra note 1, at 374–75. 
51. Oral Argument at 48:40–48:49, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.  
191 (1978), https://apps.oyez.org/player/#/burger6/oral_argument_audio/15885 [hereinafter 
Oliphant Oral Arguments].  This statement is a pretty clear reference to the opinion Justice 
Rehnquist also wrote in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (holding that the 
state’s regulation of a liquor license did not qualify as state action where issued to a 
discriminatory Moose Lodge unwilling to serve African Americans). 
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prosecute his crimes.  However, ICRA required these protections, which 
required tribes to uphold most of the same constitutional rights required of 
states via the reverse incorporation of the Fifth Amendment due process 
requirements by the Fourteenth Amendment,52 and some tribes had long-
standing practices mirroring the rights in the Bill of Rights.53 
Justice Rehnquist’s equivocation on the meaning of Indian status with a 
voluntary association reduces tribal sovereignty to a liberal ideal of electing 
to associate with other persons, based on a presumption that society is 
comprised of autonomous liberal subjects that then opt to associate with 
others.54  Rehnquist conveniently ignores the protections of ICRA, legislated 
by Congress.  This assertion by a SCOTUS justice reduces tribal sovereignty 
existing since time immemorial, built on a long history of culture, traditions, 
and family, to the voluntary choice to associate with a group of unrelated 
persons.  At the heart of this equivocation is his presumption of the liberal 
subject devoid of any citizenship status, which misses the key element of the 
status “Indian”: being a citizen of a sovereign government, a political status. 
A private association for the most part represents the fraternization of 
white, middle class citizens who of their own volition decide to include 
certain persons and exclude others;55 this analogy to tribes is false and fails 
to understand the unique political status of tribes and their inherent 
sovereignty as nations existing since time immemorial, relegated to 
“domestic-dependent nations” by federal Indian law and assigned this 
political status as group relational identities.  Meanwhile, the Oliphant 
holding elevates protecting the sovereignty of the non-Indian individual.56  
Liberalism was reaffirmed, over the sovereignty of a Tribal Nation; inherent 
sovereignty of a group collective disaffirmed.  Justice Rehnquist justifies this 
dispossession of sovereignty through expressing concerns about the non-
 
52. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that state actor schools 
discriminating on the basis of race was a violation of due process clause of Fifth Amendment 
and applied to states through enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
53. For example, Pascua Yaqui cultural practices have included the right of having a 
person speak on a defendant’s behalf since time immemorial. 
54. April L. Cherry explains that Locke’s liberalism asserts that “[m]en in the state of 
nature have the absolute freedom to control their property and their persons as they see fit 
within the bounds of the law of nature.”  Liberalism fails to account for structural inequalities 
reproduced by the very relational identities established within a hierarchical system of 
economic power.  April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the 
Male Sex-Right, 75 OR. L. REV. 1037, 1052 (1996). 
55. The right to include or exclude, as fundamental features of property law, is always 
wrapped up in the ways in which property rights have been accessible primarily to persons 
considered “white,” not persons of color. See Harris, supra note 2. 
56. Arguably, this prioritization of the rights of white non-Indians also reaffirms 
whiteness as property bolstered by a legal system built upon white supremacy and the implicit 
and pervasive valuation of property rights over civil rights. 
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Indian individual’s liberty.  Doing so juxtaposes the categorical identity of 
“Indian” as a group political status with the liberty interest of non-Indian U.S. 
citizens; this equivocation teases out a core inability of constitutional law to 
adequately address sovereignty possessed by Tribal Nations. 
The underlying concern of SCOTUS in the Oliphant case was that non-
Indians might not receive the same due process rights required under ICRA.  
Prior to Oliphant, tribes had the authority to prosecute Indians and non-
Indians, applying ICRA requirements to both political classifications of 
persons.  However, Rehnquist’s equivocation on “Indian” in Oliphant 
changed tribes’ authority to prosecute non-Indians.  Through analogizing 
with a voluntary association, Rehnquist implied that a tribe is no more than a 
private party not required to ensure due process for a non-Indian perpetrator; 
by implication, his statement denies the sovereignty of the Suquamish Tribe 
as a sovereign government in order to dispossess all tribes of the right to 
criminally prosecute non-Indians. 
Rehnquist makes this point most forcefully during oral arguments when 
he responds to Attorney Farr’s assertion that inherent sovereignty had 
persisted despite colonization: 
 
Do you think that was changed at all by the first sentence of the 
First Amendment – of all the Fourteenth Amendment that reads “all 
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the state 
wherein they reside?”57 
 
Upon denial, Rehnquist asks again, “You think that there is no negative 
implication of ruling out other sovereignties than the United States or the 
State in that?”58  Here, Rehnquist is asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment 
somehow abrogated the inherent sovereignty of tribes, leaving only the 
federal and state governments; however, there is no evidence to support this 
claim because if it were true, ICRA would not have been necessary.  In fact, 
the very existence of ICRA is proof that limiting tribal sovereignty requires 
Congress’s exercise of plenary power.59  Rehnquist’s prior 1972 decision in 
the Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis case, referenced by his comparison of the 
Suquamish tribe to a moose lodge, sheds light on his assumptions about tribal 
 
57. See Oliphant Oral Arguments, supra note 51 at 1:15:07–1:15:23. 
58. Id. at 1:15:25–1:15:34 (emphasis added). 
59. See also the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010, which increased the sentencing 
authority to 3 years and $15,000 of tribes who opted in by assuring additional civil rights 
protections (sentencing could be stacked for up to three charges).  Tribes opting in to TLOA 
must provide the right to counsel to defendants, the right to indigent counsel paid for by the 
tribe and assure that attorneys and judges are licensed in some jurisdiction.  TLOA also 
requires recording court proceedings. 25 U.S.C. 1302(a)(7)(C) (2010). 
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sovereignty.60 
In Moose Lodge, Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that private acts of racist 
discrimination could not be regulated by the rights enumerated in the 
constitution and reversely incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
The Court held, in part, that operation of the liquor law regulations enforced 
by the Moose Lodge did not implicate the government under the state action 
doctrine to establish a basis of an equal protection claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, explaining how “[i]t conducts all of its activities in a building 
that is owned by it.  It is not publicly funded.”61  This holding makes clear 
that SCOTUS protects the liberty interests of private individuals to both 
associate or exclude as long as doing so occurs on private property.62 
Unlike Shelley v. Kraemer,63 where the government refused to be 
implicated in reproducing racism by virtue of a court judgment that would 
enforce racially restrictive covenants excluding African Americans, the 
Moose Lodge private club operating in a private building was insulated from 
being held accountable for its racist refusal to serve alcohol to African 
Americans, despite the state having issued the liquor license.  In Moose 
Lodge, the rights of association as a private exercise of individual liberty 
were given more weight than the concern of the government’s implication in 
racist discrimination by not including an anti-discrimination provision in its 
liquor licensing statutes; here, the de facto impact was that African 
Americans were not served alcohol in any clubs because full license quotas 
precluded alternative clubs being started to serve them.64  Moose Lodge 
parses out the range of what SCOTUS will permit with regard to perceived 
racist actions by government actors: regulations not containing non-
discrimination provisions cannot implicate governments despite subsequent 
actions relating to those regulations creating disparate racial impact.  
Otherwise strict scrutiny could be triggered whenever disparate race impact 
 
60. See Oliphant Oral Arguments, supra note 51, at 48:40–48:49 (referencing Moose 
Lodge); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 163 (1972). 
61. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171. 
62. The Court makes no attempt to address one of the central critiques in Cheryl Harris’s 
article Whiteness as Property, which recognizes that property rights have not been protected 
for African Americans or Native Americans. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 171.  Protecting the 
right to discriminate in this way is particularly problematic where U.S. history of dispossession 
of labor and property has occurred disproportionately for persons of color.  The import of this 
legal rule is that if you are white, you may exclude and have your liberty reaffirmed to do so. 
Harris, supra note 2, at 1718. 
63. The legal rule here is that action prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment must be 
tied to state actors, and “the Fourteenth Amendment erects no shield against merely private 
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.”  Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).  
64. Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 163.  Both access to licenses and the right of private 
associations to exclude should be viewed as overlapping layers of white privilege, bolstering 
the exclusion of African Americans in this case. 
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occurred where a government action was implicated somewhere in the causal 
chain.65  This case is one of the first to lessen the potential impact of equal 
protection remedies through deference to private enterprises; Rehnquist’s 
pattern of deference to states’ sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment of 
the Constitution also is implied here.66  However, the larger import of Moose 
Lodge and Oliphant, in light of the history of the dispossession of property 
rights for persons of color, is that the racist liberty interest of the freedom 
(encompassing the idea of individual liberty and sovereignty) to exercise 
power over a person of color by a private entity is permissible, while a tribe’s 
authority to exercise power over a non-Indian creates fear of potential rights 
violations that SCOTUS prohibits at the expense of Tribal Nations’ 
sovereignty.  The real difference here is property rights because non-Indian 
associations possess the rights to include or exclude persons from their 
property, but sovereign nations may not include persons entering their 
territory; SCOTUS was not preserving civil rights of non-Indians, but 
reaffirming the reproduction of whiteness as property qua Indians do not 
possess the same rights to include or exclude. 
The fact that Rehnquist was willing to analogize the facts in Oliphant to 
a voluntary association that had performed racially discriminatory acts 
demonstrates his willingness to deploy fallacious equivocations to achieve 
his desired end of limiting tribal sovereignty, while expanding the liberty 
interest of non-Indians.  Doing so is an exercise of what Harris refers to as 
“whiteness as property.”  Indigenous, Tribal Nations in the U.S. are the only 
sovereigns in the world that do not possess territorial sovereignty over their 
lands because of Rehnquist’s white supremacist equivocation.  Where a tribal 
government is constrained by its own laws, traditions, culture, as well as 
ICRA, it is not analogous to a racist Moose Lodge.  However, the fact that he 
deployed such a persuasive tactic to inspire fear in his fellow justices that 
tribal governments could act in discriminatory ways when prosecuting non-
Indians was sufficient to change the course of tribal criminal jurisdiction, and 
perhaps one of the greatest ironies in constitutional jurisprudence. 
Had Rehnquist been capable of being attuned to his own white privilege 
and how that assured him and persons like him access to private associations 
conducting events on private property, perhaps he could have attempted to 
step outside of his narrow worldview to consider that Native peoples in the 
U.S. had retained inherent sovereignty limited historically only by means of 
forceful oppression and dispossession of their sacred homelands.  Private 
property and the affirmation of those rights looks very different through the 
lens that examines white privilege as affording a kind of property interest that 
 
65. This analysis is based in part upon Professor Toni Massaro’s lecture in Equal 
Protection at the James E. Rogers College of Law, Spring 2019. 
66. Id. 
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assured different liberties than enjoyed by persons of color.  However, using 
this lens, it becomes apparent how unjust it is for Rehnquist to equivocate on 
“Indian” with a voluntary association.  This fallacious equivocation relegated 
tribal sovereignty after Oliphant to a conceptual category of membership.67 
 
D.  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl: Can an Indian Child with Near 
Zero Blood Quantum Be Indian? 
 
Oliphant shifted the Supreme Court’s basis for treating Tribal Nations 
as territory-based sovereigns with jurisdiction over any person on the 
reservation towards a more limited, membership-based, sovereignty.  In her 
article Group Identity: Changing the Outsider’s Perspective,68 Melissa 
Tatum differentiates between how the legal system shifted in the 1980’s 
towards treating “Indian nations as membership-based groups; groups with 
authority only over their own members, as opposed to a territorial-based 
authority.”69  Oliphant represented the beginning of the erosion of tribes’ 
exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-members, which is illustrated by 
Rehnquist’s comparison of tribes to a moose lodge, a legal entity entirely 
untethered by equal protection laws because of SCOTUS’s liberal framing of 
the Fourteenth Amendment by the early 1970’s.  Rehnquist’s liberalism 
worldview conceptualizes tribes as forming an association of autonomous 
individuals, a group structure legally distinct from a sovereign nation and one 
that undermines rich cultural conceptualizations of tribal self-determination 
that would result in different SCOTUS rulings. 
This shift is an initial strategy for dispossessing tribes of their political 
status because authority based on territory combined with inherent 
sovereignty since time immemorial persists regardless of the population of a 
tribe’s membership.  Alternatively, if tribal authority is derived from its 
population of members, then the tribe’s political status will wax or wane 
depending on the population of members and not on tribally owned land.  
This ideological shift only makes sense through the lens of whiteness as 
 
67. Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based Views of Indian 
Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993).  The 
Oliphant case symbolizes a significant shift by SCOTUS of viewing tribal sovereignty in terms 
of membership instead of the usual way of sovereigns possessing authority over all lands 
within their territories.  While citizens of tribes are more than mere “members” of an associated 
group, SCOTUS diminished the meaning of citizenship in this case. 
68. Melissa L. Tatum, Group Identity: Changing the Outsider’s Perspective, 10 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 357, 382 (2008). 
69. Id.  Tatum’s discussion of this shift includes the scholarship of Allison Dussias who 
makes clear how SCOTUS has increasingly embraced membership as the basis for sovereignty 
where “tribes have authority over tribal members on the reservation because they are members 
of a political entity, the tribe.”  Dussias, supra note 67, at 79. 
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property, the longstanding legal process of not recognizing property rights 
for African Americans and Native peoples in the U.S. 
Where some tribes have increased their economic capacity through 
gaming revenues and purchased additional land, their jurisdiction would have 
been proportionally expanded as they increased their land base because all 
persons entering their territory would be subject to their criminal 
jurisdiction70 under a pre-Oliphant rationale.  However, if tribes are only 
allowed jurisdiction over their members (and for now, all Indians), their 
authority cannot be expanded regardless of any increased land base unless 
they increase membership.  Thereby, the otherwise sovereign power that 
tribes could otherwise exercise over all persons entering their territory is 
comparatively reduced.  The power of civil and criminal jurisdiction that 
sovereigns generally have over all persons in their territory is in effect 
diminished.  This impact on Tribal Nations in the U.S. is a reproduction of 
the genocidal logics underpinning whiteness as property because it limits the 
customary property rights enjoyed by all other sovereigns in the world.  That 
is, sovereigns have jurisdiction over all persons entering their territory. 
This shift towards individual membership primarily defining tribal 
sovereignty culminates in the recent decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby 
Girl, an opinion in which blood quantum as a qualifier for membership is 
emphasized.71  Adoptive Couple held that the ICWA72 did not apply where 
 
70. Unlike state sovereigns where jurisdiction is territory-based, different tests are 
applied for tribal civil and criminal jurisdiction based on land status as well as individual 
identity.  Tribes generally may regulate Indian lands but not lands within the reservation 
boundaries that are vested as other than tribal trust lands, tribally owned fee lands, trust or 
restricted allotments, or member-owned fee lands.  See the “Modern Series” of federal Indian 
law cases: Oliphant, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319 (1978) 
(citing the “undisputed fact that Congress has plenary authority to legislate for the Indian tribes 
in all matters, including their form of government”) (internal citations omitted); Duro v. Reina, 
495 U.S. 676 (1990) (holding that no tribal government held criminal jurisdiction over non-
member Indians) (superseded by “Duro Fix” legislation restoring jurisdiction over all Indians, 
25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (2020)); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (holding that 
Congress has constitutional power to relax restrictions imposed on the exercise of a tribe’s 
inherent legal authority); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981) (holding that Tribal 
Nations can control fishing and hunting only on Indian Lands); Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 
U.S. 438 (1997) (holding that under the Montana test, the tribal court lacked subject matter 
jurisdiction over non-members where occurrence happened on non-Indian land easement 
along highway and rebuttable exceptions do not apply); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) 
(holding that tribal courts may not assert jurisdiction over civil claims against state officials 
entering tribal land to execute warrants on members suspected of violating state law outside 
reservation). 
71. See generally Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013) (holding that the 
biological Indian father of Baby Girl was not entitled to parental rights where he had never 
had custody of the child). 
72. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 96–608, 92 Stat. 3096 (codified at 25 
U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963). 
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the Indian parent supposedly never had custody of the child because the 
primary legislative intent was to prevent unwarranted removal of Indian 
children and dissolution of Indian families, which were not implicated in this 
case.73  As summarized in the syllabus, the Court held that, 
 
The phrase “continued custody” thus refers to custody that a parent 
already has (or at least had at some point in the past).  As a result, 
§1912(f) does not apply where the Indian parent never had custody 
of the Indian child.  This reading comports with the statutory text, 
which demonstrates that the ICWA was designed primarily to 
counteract the unwarranted removal of Indian children from Indian 
families.74 
 
However, ICWA explicitly recognizes the intent “to promote the best 
interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian 
tribes and families.”75  Baby Veronica’s birth family was a Hispanic mother 
and a Cherokee father, which was the relationship that qualified her as an 
Indian child.  Due to poor communication with the birth mother, the father 
unwittingly relinquished his parental rights via text message and almost 
immediately rescinded his decision after realizing he had relinquished his 
rights to an adoptive couple; however, the mother had authorized the child’s 
adoption at birth.  Not only was the father’s custody a factual impossibility 
where he had been deployed to Iraq, but the South Carolina court’s 
inadequate notice to the Cherokee Nation using the wrong father’s name had 
likely violated the Nation’s due process rights by failing to give proper notice 
of termination of parental rights; there is also some question as to whether 
the father consented to the initial documentation relinquishing his parental 
rights where he misunderstood he was relinquishing his rights to the birth 
mother.76  Not only was ICWA construed too narrowly, a racialized basis of 
tribal sovereignty was reaffirmed by this holding despite Morton v. Mancari 
still remaining good law and affirming that “Indian” is a political status.77 
In Adoptive Couple, SCOTUS expressed clear concern that tribal 
membership would confer additional rights upon the father.  Further, certain 
SCOTUS justices expressed hesitation to consider the child’s “Indianness” 
 
73. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 638.  It is a strange twist of legal fiction here that the 
father had custody of baby Veronica from the age of 27 months until the end of the review of 
the case by SCOTUS.  While SCOTUS as a matter of procedure may not consider facts outside 
of the legal record, it’s clear that both the father and his parents had a significant relationship 
with baby Veronica that should have counted as an “Indian family.” 
74. Id. 
75. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 1. 
76. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 644–45. 
77. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537. 
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where baby Veronica’s blood quantum was nearly zero; this case 
demonstrates how the racist underpinnings of early assimilationist policies 
still haunt tribes’ ability to exercise sovereignty even over their members.  
These recent misunderstandings of Indian identity are increasingly 
worrisome with a current Supreme Court composition that is more 
conservative than the composition during the Oliphant or Adoptive Couple 
decisions.78 
Congress drafted ICWA79 to counter the hundreds of years of stealing 
Indian children from tribes and placing them in homes of white families or 
boarding schools; ICWA intended “to promote the best interests of Indian 
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and 
families.”80  The practice of stealing Indian children had been an intentional 
part of federal policy since the allotment era beginning with the General 
Allotment Act of 188781 that aimed to culturally assimilate and amalgamate 
Native peoples in the U.S. into mainstream white society.  ICWA took 
specific steps to prohibit the removal of Indian children to non-Indian homes 
in support of cultural sovereignty and self-determination, which the holding 
in Adoptive Couple undermined. 
Upon review by the SCOTUS, the issue was whether the legislative bar 
on involuntary termination of parental rights in the absence of serious harm 
to the Indian child will result in violation of parent’s rights to continued 
custody.  The justices ultimately decided in a 5:4 vote that the father had 
never had custody as defined under ICWA despite custody of 27 months 
during the SCOTUS case.  Sotomayor dissented by asserting the majority 
opinion was, “manifestly contrary to Congress’ express purpose in enacting 
ICWA: preserving the familial bonds between Indian parents and their 
children and, more broadly, Indian tribes’ relationships with their own future 
 
78. During the Oliphant case, SCOTUS was comprised of Justices William Rehnquist, 
Byron White, Harry Blackmun, Thurgood Marshall, Potter Stewart, John Paul Stevens, Lewis 
Powell, and Warren Burger (6:2).  During the Adoptive Couple case, SCOTUS was comprised 
of Justices John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, Samuel Alito, 
Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan (5:4).  With the 
addition of Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh upon Scalia’s and Kennedy’s departures, the 
composition became slightly more “neo-liberal.”  Both justices are conservative, though 
somewhat unpredictable as to their holdings on certain issues.  Gorsuch’s recent commitment 
to uphold the promise made to the Muskogee Creek Nation (and thereby, all “Indians”) in the 
McGirt decision provides some hope that federal trust obligations will continue to be honored 
and Mancari upheld. McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2542.  It remains to be seen what impact Justice 
Ginsburg’s replacement will have on SCOTUS’s approach to Indian law cases. 
79. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963. 
80. See WILKINS & STARK, supra note 10, at 1. 
81. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000). 
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citizens who are ‘vital to [their] continued existence and integrity.’”82  The 
dissent makes clear the decision does not align with the intent of ICWA. 
During the oral arguments, the underlying concerns about Indian 
identity became clearer.  Justice Alito begins the written opinion by 
referencing the blood quantum of Baby Girl: “This case is about a little girl 
(Baby Girl) who is classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) 
Cherokee.”83  However, this focus upon blood quantum, a racist classification 
that would likely prompt strict scrutiny under equal protection case law, is 
not how the identity classification of “Indian” is described in the controlling 
decision of Morton v. Mancari.84  Mancari distinguished that hiring 
preference for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs was a preference based 
on a unique political status, members of federally recognized tribes.85  Insofar 
as tribal membership is based on political status, it should not be construed 
as a racialized basis as SCOTUS clearly did in Adoptive Couple.  Baby Girl 
is Indian by virtue of being eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation 
because of her biological parent’s membership; her status is derived from her 
relationship status with a tribal member, not her race.  Similarly, U.S. 
naturalization policy is based upon derivative relationships between parents 
and children, spouses, and siblings.  However, several attorneys deceptively 
framed the legal issue in terms of race instead of political status, to which the 
majority of justices were amenable. 
Counsel Blatt, attorney for Adoptive Couple, set the stage for 
erroneously tying constitutional concerns to Indian racial status by 
highlighting the potential import of disqualifying a non-Indian adoptive 
couple.  “Second, it would raise grave constitutional concerns.  I mean, just 
look at (a)(3) on the other Indian families if Congress presumptively 
presumed that a non-Indian parent was unfit to raise any child with any 
amount of Indian blood.”86  Here, Counsel Blatt focuses on blood quantum 
that would be an unconstitutional basis for determining parental rights under 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but this reading of the 
facts legally misrepresents the dispositive issue – citizenship or eligibility for 
citizenship in a federally recognized tribe.  This covert equivocation on the 
meaning of “Indian child” is a rhetorical move to persuade the Court that 
certain provisions of ICWA, if construed to exclude on a racialized basis 
would invalidate those provisions as unconstitutional.  However, it 
homogenizes differences between Tribal Nations with regard to blood 
 
82. Adoptive Couple, 570 U.S. at 691–92 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
83. Id. at 641. 
84. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 535. 
85. Id. 
86. Oral Argument at 12:44–13:00, Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637 (2013),  
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2012/12-399 [hereinafter Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple] 
(argument by Att’y Blatt for Adoptive Couple). 
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quantum as a qualifier for membership; interestingly, the Cherokee Nation 
does not require minimum blood quantum for enrollment as a citizen. 
Attorney Clement, who argued the case as Guardian ad Litem in support 
of Adoptive Couple, also asserted race, citing concerns expressed about the 
statute’s discriminatory basis along race lines: 
 
And that’s what makes this child an Indian child here, it’s 
biology, it’s biology combined with the fact that the tribe, based on 
a racial classification, thinks that somebody with . . .  1 percent 
Indian blood is enough to make them a tribal . . . member, eligible 
for tribal membership.  And as a result of that, her whole world 
changes and this whole inquiry changes. 
It goes from an inquiry focused on her best interests and it 
changes to a focus on the birth father and whether or not beyond a 
reasonable doubt there is a clear and present danger.87 
 
Attorney Clement’s omission of the Mancari basis of membership as 
political status is unconscionable where the Cherokee Nation clearly does not 
base membership on blood quantum but lineal ancestry.  The Cherokee 
Constitution enumerates that: 
 
All citizens of the Cherokee Nation must be original enrollees 
or descendants of original enrollees listed on the Dawes 
Commission Rolls, including the Delaware Cherokees of Article II 
of the Delaware Agreement dated the 8th day of May, 1867, and the 
Shawnee Cherokees of Article III of the Shawnee Agreement dated 
the 9th day of June, 1869, and/or their descendants.88 
 
Attorney Clement’s oral argument focuses solely on membership 
construed as determined by the degree of “Indian blood” passed between 
tribal member parents and their biological children.  However, biology is not 
determinative for the Cherokee Nation, which did not include blood quantum 
criteria when it became a federally recognized tribe under the Dawes Act of 
188789 and recognizes citizens who are lineal descendants of any person 
listed on the Dawes rolls.90  This kinship basis has no reliance on the racial 
fiction of blood quantum, and the authority to self-define membership is 
 
87. Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple, supra note 86 at 26:44–27:20 (argument by Att’y 
Clement, Guardian ad Litem in support of Adoptive Couple) (emphasis added). 
88. CHEROKEE NATION CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
89. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000). 
90. See Frequently Asked Questions, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/ 
about-the-nation/frequently-asked-questions/common-questions/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
2 - BABLE HRPLJ V18-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2020  8:23 AM 
54 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 18 
derived from tribes’ inherent sovereignty as nations; that is, the federal 
government does not have the authority to define membership based on blood 
quantum and ICWA defines “Indian child” as a child eligible for membership 
and a biological child of a member.91 
It becomes clear in the oral arguments that Justice Roberts both believes 
that blood quantum is determinative for Cherokee citizenship, and that the 
prospect that a child with a “near zero” blood quantum is considered Indian 
is problematic when he asks, 
 
If – if you had a tribe, is there at all a threshold before you can 
call, under the statute, a child an “Indian child”? 3/256ths? 
And what if the tribe – what if you had a tribe with a zero 
percent blood requirement; they’re open for, you know, people who 
want to apply, who think culturally they’re a Cherokee or – or any 
number of fundamentally accepted conversions.  I mean, is it – is – 
would that child be considered an Indian child, so a father who had 
renounced any interest in her until he found out about the adoption 
would have all these rights?”92 
 
This line of questioning is problematic because it implies that 
insufficient blood quantum might mean that a tribe’s “Indian” political status 
is not justified, overturning Mancari.  At this point during oral arguments, 
Justice Ginsburg clarifies the meaning of “Indian Child” and explains that 
“[a]n Indian child is someone who is either a member of a tribe or eligible, 
and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”93  This 
clarification prompts an emotional response from Justice Breyer, who then 
says, 
 
But that is a problem. 
Because, look, I mean, as it appears in this case is he had three 
Cherokee ancestors at the time of George Washington’s father. 
 
91. Barbara Atwood’s analysis in her article, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare 
Act, “attempts to maintain a skepticism about the grand narratives that underlie the Act itself, 
a wariness about categories that essentialize persons on the basis of group membership, and 
an approach to identity that recognizes its fluid, dynamic, and highly contextual character.”  
Barbara Ann Atwood, Flashpoints Under the Indian Child Welfare Act: Toward a New 
Understanding of State Court Resistance, 51 EMORY L.J. 587, 598 (2002).  Atwood attempts 
to articulate a postmodern perspective of identity through her use of Jean-Francois Lyotard, 
who she describes as “envision[ing] a society in which diverse value systems coexist, not as 
hermetically sealed structures but as dynamic and interactive fluid processes.”  Id. at 601.  This 
movement away from fixed concepts of identity is critical for more just legal systems. 
92. Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple, supra note 86, at 35:53–36:25 (statement of 
Roberts, C.J) (emphasis added). 
93. Id. at 36:50–37:00 (statement of Ginsburg, J.). 
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All right? 
Now, you say, oh, well, that’s a different issue. 
But I don’t see how to decide that case without thinking about 
this issue, because if your view is taken and you accept that 
definition, a woman who is a rape victim who has never seen the 
father could, would, in fact, be at risk under this statute that the child 
would be taken and given to the father who has never seen it and 
probably just got out of prison, all right? 
And you don’t know that this beyond reasonable doubt 
standard would satisfy that.  Now, that’s obviously something I find 
disturbing, as a person and also as a judge, because we’re trying to 
interpret the statute to avoid results that would be very far out, at 
least. 
And – and that’s what I want you to tell me. 
How do I prevent that kind of risk through an interpretation of 
the statute?94 
 
Justice Breyer is concerned that a male rapist who counts as Indian, but 
is not a “real” Indian because of a nearly zero blood quantum, might have 
paternal rights under ICWA.  However, his hyperbolic fears are irrational and 
seething with racist overtures linked to being Indian.  Justice Breyer’s 
presumption that blood quantum is determinative for membership in the 
Cherokee Nation, or that it should be, illustrates his ignorance that tribal 
membership is a political status. 
It is equally worrisome when Justice Roberts implies that rights 
allocated because of a presumed sufficient Indian blood quantum of near zero 
are particularly problematic.  He asks, “I mean, that’s – that’s the question in 
terms to me, that if you have a definition, is it one drop of blood that triggers 
all these extraordinary rights?”95  The irony here, of course, is that African 
Americans were dispossessed of status under Jim Crow laws based on one 
drop of blood, which made them “colored.”  Under the Virginia Racial 
Integrity laws, an Indian ancestor sufficiently distant in lineage might have 
meant that descendants were no longer “colored.”96  Justice Roberts’ 
 
94. Oral Argument in Adoptive Couple, supra note 86, at 37:49–38:55 (statement of 
Breyer, J.) (emphasis added). 
95. Id. at 40:12–40:20 (statement of Roberts, C.J.). 
96. Under laws such as the Virginia Racial Integrity Act, which were not overturned until 
1967, persons were either “white” or “colored,” which meant that one drop of Indian blood 
classified persons as colored and not white.  See Richard B. Sherman, “The Last Stand”: The 
Fight for Racial Integrity in Virginia in the 1920s, 54 J. S. HIST. 69 (1988).  Persons classified 
as “colored” could not enjoy the same privileges as whites in the segregated South.  This 
strategy prior to 1934 preceded the reaffirmation of tribes’ self-determination under IRA.  An 
exception called the “Pocahontas Exception” was made for grandchildren with 1/16th or less 
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emphasis on one drop of blood reaffirms this genocidal logic: one drop of 
blood as an Indian should make you white, not Indian.97  This question makes 
clear Justice Breyer’s concern about tying the power of these “extraordinary 
rights” to Indian status, precisely because Indians have been historically 
excluded from institutional power since “discovery” or “occupation” of the 
Americas.  However, the Mancari decision clearly asserted that rights 
established by Congress to fulfill the U.S. obligation towards Indians would 
not be disturbed.98  Here, the right to raise one’s own children or for a 
sovereign nation to retain decision making authority over its own citizens 
being viewed as an “extraordinary right” makes sense only through this lens 
of racism that attaches the category of dependency to the category of Indian.  
This permissive assimilation where blood quantum is insufficient to count as 
Indian coincides throughout the implicit practices of whiteness as property in 
the U.S. because to become white meant the disappearance of Tribal citizen 
property rights that one might otherwise possess, not the attachment of so-
called “extraordinary rights!” 
Justices Breyer’s and Roberts’ assiduous focus upon blood quantum 
illustrates the court’s refusal to acknowledge the cultural and political 
sovereignty of tribes.  Implicit in these racist admissions is the refusal to 
recognize Tribal Nations as nations possessing inherent sovereignty, with the 
rights implicit in ensuring its own posterity through retaining its own citizen 
children as the foundation for building strong communities and nations.  This 
opinion further denies the inherent sovereignty of tribes that would assure 
their sovereignty over all individuals located within its territorial boundaries.  
After this case, SCOTUS shifted towards acknowledging sovereignty as an 
association of membership, which diminishes the inherent sovereignty that 
tribes have enjoyed since time immemorial. 
 
Indian blood.  See Virginia Racial Integrity Act, discussed at length in Kevin Noble Maillard, 
The Pocahontas Exception: The Exemption of American Indian Ancestry from Racial Purity 
Law, 12 MICH. J. RACE & L. 351, 352 (2007); An Act to Preserve Racial Integrity, ch. 371, 
§5099a, 1924 Va. Acts 534 (repealed 1975). 
97. Assignment of a “mixed blood” person to a category of persons relationally 
subordinated in a white supremacist system is referred to as “hypodescent.”  See Marvin 
Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 796 (1965).  Hypodescent 
for African Americans persisted because of the legal liability of dispossessed labor, a 
persisting debt owed by the U.S. for the labor that was stolen to construct the economic 
foundation of the U.S.  To acknowledge whiteness is also to bestow access to property rights 
to which persons of color have historically lacked access; whiteness as a property interest itself 
was made clear in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that “one drop of blood” 
was sufficient for Mr. Plessy to be deemed “colored” and dispossessed of the otherwise 
available property interests available via his perceived whiteness).  This tactic was reversed 
for Indigenous peoples, which J. Kēhaulani Kauanui calls “hyperdecent,” assimilating  
them into white society for the sake of perfecting property dispossession.  See infra note 129, 
at 14–15. 
98. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 537. 
2 - BABLE HRPLJ V18-1 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/2/2020  8:23 AM 
Winter 2021] TRIBALLY DEFINED CITIZENSHIP CRITERIA 57 
E.  Precarity of Equal Protection Clause for Indian Political Status 
– Excluding Blood Quantum from Membership Criteria 
 
Recent scholarship has examined the precarity of Indian political status 
resulting from an inaccurate interpretation of federal Indian law precedent 
surrounding tribal sovereignty.  The judiciary persists in questioning tribal 
sovereignty because of equal protection concerns, despite tribes’ inherent 
sovereignty persisting since time immemorial.  This shift since Oliphant 
towards a membership-focused view of tribal sovereignty, instead of 
recognition of inherent sovereignty, captures the current precarity posed for 
federally recognized tribes. 
In her article titled, Geographically-Based and Membership-Based 
Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing Vision, 
Allison M. Dussias explains how this shift has impacted the SCOTUS view 
of tribal sovereignty.99  The Cherokee cases,100 decided shortly after the 
country’s founding, clearly established any Indian tribe’s authority over all 
individuals and activities within its geographic territory.  However, later 
SCOTUS cases narrowed the recognition of tribe’s inherent authority over 
individuals as limited depending on the identity of the individual.101 
The holding of Oliphant v. Suquamish uniquely shifted prior SCOTUS 
precedent.  In an artful trick of rhetoric, the opinion asserted that federally 
recognized tribes had come under the territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States, as if Europeans had not emigrated to the territory of what later became 
the U.S.!102  This invention was entirely the creation of the Court, ex nihilo, 
 
99. See Dussias, supra note 67. 
100. Dussias refers specifically to the Cherokee cases of the Marshall Trilogy, three 
SCOTUS cases written by John Marshall that establish the original parameters of Federal 
Indian Law in the U.S.: Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S 543, 584, 587 (1823) (holding that tribes 
were not “civilized,” which precluded the recognition of Indian fee simple title ownership by 
the U.S.; Britain had fee simple title under the Doctrine of Discovery, so all lands owned by 
Britain transferred to U.S. after revolutionary war); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 
16, 31 (1831) (where the Cherokee Nation injunction to stop Georgia’s laws from being 
imposed on its territory was denied because Cherokee nation is a state and not a foreign nation, 
thus, SCOTUS has no jurisdiction over the dispute between two states); Worcester v. Georgia., 
31 U.S. 515, 540 (1832) (holding that Georgia judgment was void, interfering forcibly with 
relations between U.S. and Cherokee Nation where Georgia had attempted to enforce its law 
imposing fines for whites on the Cherokee Nation).  Collectively, these opinions establish the 
trust relationship between the U.S. government and tribes as one giving tribes the right to 
exclude persons from their aboriginal lands (occupancy rights only under Discovery Doctrine 
proclaiming “uncivilized” people could not own land in fee); established tribes as sovereign 
wards of the U.S., as “Domestic Dependent Nations”; and recognized the lack of authority by 
states over tribes. 
101. See Dussias, supra note 67, at 4. 
102. Id. at 29.  While this language represents a significant shift, the limitations imposed 
were specific to criminal jurisdiction.  Civil jurisdiction in Indian Country remained primarily 
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the same Court that had previously recognized treaties with sovereign Indian 
nations and recognized Indian Country land within the U.S. as governed by 
these sovereign Tribal Nations; this rhetorical trick had a legal breadth with 
significant implications for limiting tribal sovereignty.  In this one opinion, 
tribal sovereignty was well on its way to being treated as based on 
membership-based criteria, which made tribal inherent sovereignty less 
visible, though not extinguished. 
The Adoptive Couple opinion is the culmination of the work of 
dispossessing tribes of unlimited territorial jurisdiction over tribal lands by 
way of acknowledging Baby Girl’s Indian status only in terms of blood 
quantum.  Once this shift is well-established, as Adoptive Couple illustrated, 
the risk of further erosion of tribal sovereignty based upon membership-based 
conceptions of sovereignty increased.  However, the federal government has 
offered no single, accepted definition of Indian, “which can only complicate 
the resolution of jurisdictional disputes in which federal statutes or the 
Supreme Court have made Indian identity determinative.”103  Ultimately, 
connecting blood quantum as a qualifier for determining membership 
provides further rationale for the conservative members of the Court to 
attempt to entirely dispossess tribes of their special political status.  However, 
as Abi Fain and Mary Kathryn Nagle succinctly highlight, Congress first 
required the use of blood quantum for tribal membership during allotment 
era policies as a mechanism of dispossessing Indians of remaining lands.104 
As Fain and Nagle explain, the allotment acts “took more than tribal 
lands: they took the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own 
requirements for citizenship.”105  This diminishment became most apparent 
under the Dawes Commission, which was authorized to determine who 
counted as a citizen of a Tribal Nation “for any, and all purposes, not just 
allotment.”106  The Dawes Act and the Commission it created constituted a 
legal authority that defined the parameters of who could be counted as Indian 
according to the rolls of individual names created.  This power to constitute 
who would be Indian or not culminated in the Curtis Act, which effectively 




103. See Dussias, supra note 67, at 84. 
104. Abi Fain & Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The Reliance on Minimum Blood 
Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in the Allotment Acts and the Post-
Adoptive Couple Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA, 43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 
801, 823–25, 833 (2017). 
105. Id. at 833. 
106. Id. at 834. 
107. Id.  It might be argued that the Dawes Act represented the rhetorical shift towards 
the language of membership, versus citizenship for Tribal Nations. 
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The same year as the Curtis Act, the Secretary of the Interior 
implemented the policy of determining competency of Indians allotted lands 
based almost exclusively on the amount of “blood quantum” the Indian 
“possessed.”108  The Commission of Indian Affairs explicitly expressed this 
intent, explaining that “[t]he Tribal relations should be broken up, socialism 
destroyed, and the family and the autonomy of the individual substituted.”109  
This statement very clearly articulates the liberal tradition underlying 
assimilation policy arising in the common law under John Locke’s theory of 
accession110 and played out in Indian policy since the founding of the U.S.  
Only Indian landowners who added labor, and thereby, value to the land 
owned by cultivating and farming it were “competent.”  More fundamentally, 
individual labor added value to property in order to perfect an ownership 
interest to the allottee. 
Collective labor could not add value to property under this liberalism 
framework, as individual allotments were made only to Indians who left the 
reservation.  This allotment process and the determination of “competency” 
covertly equivocated on its meaning because qua “Indians,” the U.S. 
government had a fiduciary duty that relegated Indians to a dependent ward 
status, making Indians presumptively “incompetent.”  That fiduciary duty 
disappeared when an Indian was deemed competent through assimilation into 
white cultural norms by improving land owned, qua individual U.S. 
citizenship and not as a citizen of a Tribal Nation.  That is, by adopting the 
norms of white culture, it was not only that the Indian individual became 
competent, they became white.111  This specific “competency” policy was 
another intentional maneuver for the government to assimilate citizens of 
Tribal Nations into white liberal society, including granting citizenship along 
with the lifting of restrictions on allotted lands. 
The lesser the blood quantum, the more “competent” the Indian allottee 
was likely to be deemed; racist norms of whiteness, cultivation of land as a 
highly valued societal “good,” and individual property ownership as the 
foundation of liberal ideology overlapped.  That is, the less Indian blood a 
person possessed, the more likely persons were to be deemed competent; this 
circular logic, where incompetence was the premise presumed by the very 
 
108. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 839. 
109. Id. at 840 (quoting Thomas J. Morgan, Statement on Indian Policy, reprinted in 
AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIANS 75 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973)). 
110. According to the law of accession, when the labor of one’s person adds value to 
property of another, it establishes an ownership claim.  This utilitarian orientation undergirds 
all property law and prioritizes individual rights over group rights.  John Locke’s theories 
arose during the Enlightenment Era of Western European philosophy; these ideologies 
continue to shape most of the ethical orientation of the common law in the U.S. today.  See, 
e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 14 (9th ed. 2017). 
111. See KAUANUI, infra note 129, at 89-90. 
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policy resulting in dispossession of lands, was a rhetorical strategy 
reproducing whiteness as property as explained by Harris.  While masked as 
transferring ownership to “competent” individual Indians, the impact of 
allotment was the erosion of the collective political power of tribes through 
dispossessing Tribal Nations of most of their lands.  “That is, the erasure of 
tribal citizenship coincided with the loss of Indian-owned lands.”112  The 
territory of Tribal Nations was collectively diminished; less territory meant 
there was less area over which tribes could exercise tribal jurisdiction.  
However, despite the reduction of Indian lands during allotment, Tribal 
Nations retained criminal jurisdiction over all persons in its territory until the 
modern era of SCOTUS federal Indian law cases.113 
However, as long as tribal citizens exist, Tribal Nations cannot be 
broken up entirely.  The persistence of tribes past the allotment era provided 
the U.S. government with additional incentives in addition to land coveted 
by whites to dispossess tribal membership through blood quantum 
requirements.114  The impact of dispossession via the tool of blood quantum 
persists today in the ICWA cases. 
Although SCOTUS reaffirmed inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes in 
Morton v. Mancari and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, there have been 
several other equal protection challenges based upon blood quantum since 
Adoptive Couple.  Fain and Nagle explain that, 
 
The Supreme Court’s “near zero” blood quantum/ancestry 
dicta in Adoptive Couple likewise contradicts the Court’s conclusion 
in Morton v. Mancari, in which the Court held that following 
Congress’s departure from the Allotment Acts’ reliance on a 
threshold amount of blood quantum to define citizenship, post-1934, 
“Indian” under federal law signifies citizenship in a Tribal Nation 
and is therefore a political, and not a racial, classification.  And the 
Supreme Court’s suggestion that it could impose a minimum blood 
quantum requirement to define Cherokee Nation citizenship directly 
contradicts the Court’s affirmance in Santa Clara Pueblo v. 
Martinez of the inherent right of Tribal Nations to define their own 
citizenship.115 
 
These new blood quantum bases for equal protection claims are 
unfounded.116  Two key cases were brought more recently by the National 
 
112. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 839. 
113. See Dussias, supra note 67. 
114. See Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 840.  
115. Id. at 869 (emphasis added). 
116. “And yet, despite this jurisprudential dissonance, because of Adoptive Couple’s 
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Council for Adoption (NCA) on May 27, 2015 and Goldwater institute on 
July 6, 2015 in federal district courts, Eastern District of Virginia and District 
of Arizona respectively.117  While both claims failed, it was not because their 
equal protection arguments were rejected.  In the NCA lawsuit, National 
Council for Adoption v. Jewell, the complaint “attempts to revise the ‘Indian 
child’ definition in ICWA by conflating Indian ancestry with tribal 
membership.”118  Similarly, in A.D. v. Washburn, 
 
[T]he Goldwater Institute’s action attempts to insert the words 
“Indian ancestor” or “ancestry” into ICWA’s “Indian child” 
definition.  A plain reading of the statute – as well as an 
understanding of the evolution of “Indian” under federal law – 
reveals that the Goldwater Institute’s insertion of “Indian ancestor” 
is nothing more than an attempt to create a racial classification 
where none exists.119 
 
While this case was dismissed for a lack of standing, it is worrisome that 
well-funded, conservative organizations continue to challenge the 
constitutionality of Tribal Nation membership using equal protection 
grounds.  While ICWA remains good law, there continue to be challenges 
based on equal protection. 
Most recently the Brackeen v. Bernhardt case made its way up through 
the federal courts to the Fifth Circuit, and the Court reaffirmed that “Indian” 
classification is a political status, subject to rational basis review.120  The 
Court comprehensively denied the facial constitutional challenges raised.  
According to the Native American Rights Fund (NARF) and National Indian 
Child Welfare Association (NICWA), the Court made two key points, “[1] 
ICWA is ‘related to tribal self-government and the survival of tribes’. . . and 
[2] it held that Congress’s Indian affairs power is not limited to Indian 
Country, but instead extends to ‘Indians and Indian tribes on and off the 
reservation.’”121  The first assertion clearly reaffirms the inherent sovereignty 
 
blood quantum/ancestry dicta, agencies that work to place Indian children in non-Indian homes 
are leading the way in bringing race-based constitutional challenges to ICWA’s ‘Indian child’ 
classification.”  Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 869. 
117. For a thorough analysis, see Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 870–79. 
118. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 870. 
119. Id. at 873. 
120. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406, 416 (5th Cir. 2019).  According to the Native 
American Rights Fund, the Fifth Circuit agreed to rehear this case en banc the week of January 
20, 2020; oral arguments were heard by the 16-judge panel on January 22, 2020.  The opinion 
has not yet been published; however, a decision overturning the three-panel Fifth Circuit 
decision would likely be at odds with the recent McGirt decision affirming the U.S. 
government’s fiduciary obligation to Tribal Nations.  See McGirt, 140 S. Ct. 2542. 
121. Brackeen v. Bernhardt Case Summary, NAT’L INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ASS’N (Oct. 
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of tribes.  The latter point articulates that Congress’s plenary power over 
Indian affairs extends to Indians and tribes regardless of their presence on 
tribal lands.  The Brackeen decision is important because of its recognition 
of the inherent sovereignty of federally recognized tribes; its reassertion of 
Congress’s plenary power is also critical because it insulates SCOTUS’s 
practice in Oliphant and Adoptive Couple of legislating from the bench.  As 
Fain and Nagle have so eloquently stated, 
 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Congress was the branch 
of the federal government that attempted to impose minimum blood 
quantum requirements to extinguish Tribal Nations and their 
citizens.  Today, it is the Supreme Court.  Congress, of course, 
ultimately dismissed the imposition of a federally mandated 
minimum blood quantum to define eligibility for tribal 
citizenship. . . . [T]he current blood quantum-based challenges to 
ICWA trace their origins to an American policy wrongfully 
designed to eradicate Tribal Nations and their citizens.122 
 
While the Brackeen decision confirms tribes’ inherent sovereignty to 
define their own citizenship for now, the persistence of blood quantum as an 
arguably racialized basis for membership would still leave most Tribal 
Nations vulnerable to continued scrutiny given the current conservative 
composition of SCOTUS.  If the current Court grants certiorari for a future 
ICWA case based on equal protection claims, it’s highly likely that a ruling 
could assert that Tribal Nations with membership criteria based on blood 
quantum are facially unconstitutional.  Any such ruling could have 
significant negative consequences for tribes.  When the rhetorical strategies 
of SCOTUS are examined through the lens of whiteness as property, this 
reproduction of a new variety of Tribal Nation dispossession by creating 
precarity surrounding tribal sovereignty becomes clearer. 
 
III.  SAFETY IN NUMBERS AND REAFFIRMING 
INHERENT SOVEREIGNTY: SELF-DETERMINED 
MEMBERSHIP WITHOUT BLOOD QUANTUM 
 
While the Indian Reorganization Act intended to restore tribes’ power 
to self-define their own citizenship, a large number of tribes created 
constitutions in a very short time.  The federal government provided 
boilerplate constitutions to expedite the process for tribes to adopt 
 
17, 2019), https://www.nicwa.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/2019-10-17-Brackeen-v-Bern 
hardt-Case-Summary-Final.pdf (quoting Brackeen, 937 F.3d at 427, n.9). 
122. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 880. 
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constitutions that would likely be approved by the Secretary of the Interior; 
however, many of these constitutions did not fit tribal customs or traditions.  
During the self-determination era of the 1970’s, many tribes revised these 
constitutions to better match their customs and traditions.  However, most 
constitutions still include blood quantum provisions and require approval by 
the Secretary of the Interior to make any amendments to them.  Both elements 
limit tribes’ sovereignty to self-determine citizenship because blood quantum 
needlessly narrows tribes’ ability to self-determine who their citizens will be 
independent of historical residues of allotment policies and make tribes 
dependent on the secretary of the interior’s approval for constitutional 
amendments.  Further, blood quantum was an intentional tactic by the federal 
government to eliminate the existence of “Indian” as a special status along 
with its associated legal rights; to retain blood quantum is to help perpetuate 
this “disappearance” because it’s improbable that citizens of tribes will only 
have children with citizens of their same tribe, especially given the proximity 
of most of Indian Country to non-Indian communities. 
 
A. Tribal Nation Constitutions: Inherent Sovereignty as Self-
Determination of Citizens 
 
Constitutions comprise the fundamental law of a nation and are outward 
expressions of the principles governing the relationships between the 
government and the people.123  Constitutions may be oral or written, despite 
the bias of the common law tradition that they be written.  A constitution is 
itself the foundation for a government to act with authority over the people 
comprising the nation.  There are usually four elements included in every 
constitution: 1) Preamble expressing identity of the nation; 2) articulation of 
who qualifies as a citizen; 3) characterization of the relationship between the 
government and citizens; and 4) expression of who exercises power (e.g., 
three branches of government share power). Articulation of who qualifies as 
a citizen has become a critical component of tribal sovereignty because of 
how it shapes power limited by the U.S. government; particularly, blood 
quantum persists as a strategic tool of dispossession that plays out under the 
genocidal logics of whiteness as property. 
According to Russell Thornton at the National Research Council 
Committee on Population,124 some tribes after IRA elected to include blood 
quantum criteria for citizenship; however, the general trend has been towards 
 
123. This overview was adapted from a lecture: Professor Melissa Tatum, James E. 
Rogers College of Law, Native American Law and Policy (Fall 2018). 
124. Russell Thornton, Tribal Membership Requirements and the Demography of “Old” 
and “New” Native Americans, in CHANGING NUMBERS, CHANGING NEEDS: AMERICAN INDIAN 
DEMOGRAPHY AND PUBLIC HEALTH (Gary Sandefur et al. eds., 1996). 
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eliminating it.  Based on his survey of 302 tribes, Thornton found that 
approximately 204 of Tribal Nations surveyed still included blood quantum 
to qualify for citizenship, 98 tribes did not.  While some tribes may hesitate 
to eliminate blood quantum from their constitutions by virtue of it being a 
long-standing requirement, the recent treatment by SCOTUS of blood 
quantum as a potential equal protection violation may offer sufficient reason 
to eliminate it from their enrollment qualifications. 
 
B.  Blood Quantum Requirements of American Indian Tribes by 








21 183 98 
Reservation 
based 
85.7% 83.1% 63.9% 
Median size 1022 1096 1185 
Chart adapted from Thornton’s Table 5-1.125 
 
To avoid further threats of dispossession to tribal sovereignty by the 
current SCOTUS, federally recognized tribes might consider making 
constitutional amendments, if their constitutions contain racialized 
membership criteria like blood quantum.  Doing so would both insulate tribal 
governments from equal protection claims as well as diminish the colonizing 
influence of liberal ideologies of federal Indian law; since the writing of the 
Constitution, SCOTUS has often contradicted long-standing legal principles 
with regard to “Indians” when it suited the political climate of the time.  
Considering that “[a]fter more than a century of defining ‘Indian’ based on 
citizenship in a Tribal Nation. . .the United States federal government, for the 
first time, altered the legal definition of ‘Indian’ to be contingent upon a 
minimum amount of blood quantum” during the allotment era, ideological 
decolonization requires elimination of blood quantum criteria.126  Oliphant 
and, more recently, the ICWA cases have revived the threat of blood quantum 
as determining Indian status and threatening to further limit tribal 
sovereignty. The return of the conservative members of SCOTUS to fixation 
upon blood quantum in the Adoptive Couple case is indicative of a revival of 
questioning the inherent sovereignty of Tribal Nations. 
While the way in which the Oliphant court “flipped the script” to create 
 
125. Thornton, supra note 124, at 107. 
126. Fain & Nagle, supra note 104, at 840–41. 
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ex nihilo federal Indian law precedence limiting recognition of territorial 
sovereignty over tribal lands was a further act of colonizing Tribal Nations, 
federally recognized tribes can elect to remove blood quantum from their 
constitutions to begin further distancing themselves from the tradition of 
liberalism as well as prioritize self-identified and culturally specific criteria.  
This exercise of sovereignty intersects with the ways in which the federal 
government treats “Indians” as a political group and the translation of those 
group rights to individuals. By exercising this inherent sovereignty to self-
determine citizenship, Tribal Nations reaffirm the very sovereignty that 
otherwise is contested by SCOTUS. 
Furthermore, by ensuring that tribal constitutions embody culturally 
appropriate citizenship criteria based on their nation’s spiritual practices, 
ways of being and knowing, cultural sovereignty is reaffirmed.  Amended 
criteria would be less likely to be subject to strict scrutiny by the SCOTUS.  
In addition, it’s likely that doing so will help tribes to better align their 
cultural beliefs with citizenship criteria, a potentially decolonizing change 
that could reclaim tribes’ views of whom should be included in their own 
tribal communities. 
The Cherokee Nation did not include blood quantum criteria when it 
became a federally recognized tribe under the Dawes Act of 1887127 and 
recognizes citizens who are lineal descendants of any person listed on the 
Dawes rolls.128  Whereas most tribes included some percentage of blood 
quantum requirement because of its inclusion in the IRA, tribes already 
federally recognized possess the authority to revise their constitutions subject 
to approval by the BIA.  Tribal councils and members should assess the 
impact this kind of change could have on the day-to-day government 
operations and include mitigation planning processes.  However, through the 
act of asserting sovereignty with regard to how citizenship may be defined, 
tribes can further reaffirm their political and cultural sovereignty.  The group 
right of self-determination must govern the autonomy of all U.S. Tribal 
Nations to determine their membership qua citizenship as fundamental to 
their inherent sovereignty. 
 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
Whether or not inclusion of a blood quantum requirement could 
jeopardize future sovereignty is a pressing concern that may warrant 
reconsideration of these outdated forms of internalized colonization imposed 
 
127. General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, Pub. L. No. 49–105, 24 Stat. 388 (codified 
at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–333) (repealed 2000). 
128. Frequently Asked Questions, CHEROKEE NATION, https://www.cherokee.org/all-
services/tribal-registration/frequently-asked-questions/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2020). 
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by the U.S. government during the General Allotment Act era.  While Native 
Hawaiians are unique in their classification outside the boundaries of 
“Indian” because they are not federally recognized, J. Kēhaulani Kauanui 
draws upon her cultural traditions to propose a persuasive alternative to blood 
quantum criteria in Hawaiian Blood: Colonialism and the Politics of 
Sovereignty and Indigeneity.129  Kauanui suggests a reversion to kinship 
relationships is appropriate, explaining the Hawaiian view that “genealogies 
frequently serve as a device intended to aid in cultural memory.  They are 
metaphorical in that they are both allegorical and symbolic, but they are also 
literal since Hawaiian kinship is based on a system of common descent.”130  
Kauanui’s kinship basis serves as an example of a decolonizing method that 
might redefine identity on terms that arise from within the cultural group, 
setting aside colonizing and genocidal logics intending only to assimilate, 
obliterate Native peoples’ traditions, and homogenize difference into one 
normative, fictionalized U.S. citizen.  U.S. Tribal Nations might, instead, 
build upon their cultural sovereignty to redefine citizenship in ways 
reaffirming and expanding both cultural and political sovereignty through 
self-determination.  The political status of federally recognized tribes 
possesses a privilege that affords them the opportunity to decolonize their 
citizenship criteria to exclude blood quantum and redefine communities 
based on current kinship beliefs.  Doing so can disrupt the historical 
reproduction of whiteness as property, genocidal logics disaffirming the 
sovereign right to include and exclude for Native peoples.  The 
approximately 98 federally recognized tribes that do not utilize blood 
quantum in their constitutions today are insulated from these genocidal logics 




129. J. KĒHAULANI KAUANUI, HAWAIIAN BLOOD: COLONIALISM AND THE POLITICS OF 
SOVEREIGNTY AND INDIGENEITY (2008). 
130. Id. at 38 (emphasis added). 
